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South African labour affairs are in a volatile state. Conflicting 
rights and interests as well as the balancing of these rights and 
interests are contributing to this state of affairs. In recent years, 
the contentious issues of workers' right to use their economic 
power to put pressure on employers and employers' recourse to 
lock-out and replacement labour have come under the spotlight 
again. Prolonged, violent and unprotected strikes have raised 
the question whether our industrial relations framework should 
be revisited, and have complicated matters even further. The 
question whether employers may use replacement labour and 
have recourse to lock-outs when an impasse exists during wage 
negotiations is considered in the context of the adversarial 
collective bargaining framework in South Africa. 
Keywords 
Collective bargaining; industrial relations; strikes, defensive and 




An Employer's Recourse to Lock-Out and  
Replacement Labour: An Evaluation of  
Recent Case Law 
MM Botha* and M Lephoto** 
 
Pioneer in peer-reviewed,  
open access online law publications 
Author 
Monray Marsellus Botha  
Motsoane Lephoto 
Affiliations 




monray.botha @up.ac.za  
lephoto44@gmail.com 
Date published  
7 December 2017 
Editor Prof AA du Plessis 
How to cite this article   
Botha MM and Lephoto M " An 
Employer's Recourse to Lock-Out 
and Replacement Labour: An 
Evaluation of Recent Case Law" 








MM BOTHA & M LEPHOTO  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  2 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of the Labour Relations Act1 (LRA) is to advance economic 
development, social justice, labour peace and democratisation of the 
workplace.2 The primary objects of the LRA include the following: "[T]o 
provide a framework within which employees and their trade unions, 
employers and employer's organisations can (i) collectively bargain to 
determine wages, terms and conditions of employment, and other matters 
of mutual interest; and (ii) formulate industrial policy"3 and (iii) "to promote 
orderly collective bargaining [and] collective bargaining at sectoral level".4 
The LRA in its purpose provision also provides for the advancement of the 
effective resolution of labour disputes. Central to collective bargaining is the 
right to strike and the recourse to lock-out available to employees and 
employers respectively. Workers exercise collective power primarily 
through the mechanism of strike action. On the other hand, employers may 
exercise power against workers "through a range of weapons, such as 
dismissal, the employment of alternative or replacement labour, the 
unilateral implementation of new terms and conditions of employment, and 
the exclusion of workers from the workplace (the last of these being 
generally called a 'lock-out')".5 
It has been said that "South Africa faces deep problems of poverty, 
unemployment and inequality"6 that these problems have a direct influence 
on participants in the labour relations environment, and that they shape the 
issues over which they engage and the manner in which they do so.7 Thus, 
the high rate of unemployment in South Africa makes it easy for employers 
to find a labour source when their employees participate in strike action.8 
In South Africa the right of workers to strike is constitutionally enshrined. 
Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
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1 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). 
2 Section 1 of the LRA. 
3 Section 1(c)(i)-(ii) of the LRA. 
4 Section 1(d)(i)-(ii) of the LRA. 
5 See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 
4 SA 744 (CC) (hereafter Certification case) para 66. 
6 Anstey 2013 SAJLR 141. 
7 Anstey 2013 SAJLR 141. 
8 Van der Welden and Dribbusch Strikes Around the World 54. 
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Constitution) unequivocally states that every worker has this right. Also, this 
right is given effect to in section 64 of the LRA. In many countries, including 
South Africa, the struggle for the right to strike has been a long and painful 
one for trade unions and workers. Historically, in South Africa striking 
constituted a criminal offence and the common law did not recognise the 
right to strike. For example, the Railway Regulation Act of 1908 denied 
railway employees the right to strike under penalty of criminal prosecution. 
Also, under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 (the 1956 LRA), strikes and 
lock-outs were illegal under certain circumstances.9 At common law, strike 
action constituted a fundamental breach of contract which entitled the 
employer to dismiss striking employees.10 It is therefore not surprising that 
the Constitutional Court has noted that the right to strike "is both of historical 
and contemporaneous significance".11 
In essence, collective bargaining is about the balancing of power so that 
employers and employees are able to utilise their respective labour 
weapons (that is, the use of replacement labour or recourse to lock-out by 
the employer and employees' right to strike). The LRA is also concerned 
with possible power imbalances, as it creates the respective rights and 
recourses that enable the parties to use their economic powers against each 
other once the matter in dispute has been unsuccessfully referred to 
conciliation Previously it was said that the relationship between collective 
bargaining and industrial action: 
… is much like the relationship between diplomacy and war [as] it is the threat 
of force and the pain which its exercise might inflict on either side which 
generally induces governments to seek solutions to international problems by 
negotiation. The threat of superior force also governs the way statesmen 
move their pieces in the bargaining game. This may entail bluff which, in the 
final analysis, can only be called by declaring open war. But even after war 
breaks out, diplomacy continues, unless the more powerful side demands 
unconditional surrender. 
However, it is unwise to push the analogy between warfare and strike action 
too far. Strikes are not battles fought in a constant war between management 
and labour; they are merely the means by which employees periodically exert 
their collective right to withdraw labour, and by which management's liability 
to do without labour is weighed against the workers' capacity to endure without 
pay. To equate strike action with warfare may lead to misconceptions, not the 
least of which is to regard strikes as a justification for drawing other 'weapons' 
to induce surrender. Strikes may often deteriorate into mob action, which the 
courts will interdict. Similarly, however, employers are tempted to regard 
dismissal as their 'ultimate weapon', a tendency corrected by the Supreme 
                                            
9 See s 12(1) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 (the 1956 LRA). 
10 See Myburgh 2004 ILJ 962; Grogan Collective Labour Law 141; SACWU v Afrox 
1999 20 ILJ 1718 (LC) para 19. 
11 NUMSA v Bader Bop 2003 24 ILJ 305 (CC) para 13. 
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Court of Appeal in Betha & others v BTR Sarmcol (a division of BTR Dunlop 
Ltd)12 … 
The above thoughts notwithstanding, it is difficult to resist comparing strikes 
and lock-outs with warfare because they both entail the use of collective power 
to force the other party to do what they do not wish to do. Strikes are calculated 
to cause harm, not only to the employer, but also to non-striking employees 
and even customers and suppliers. But strikes are not a licence to cause 
physical harm. This is why in most common-law jurisdictions courts have been 
reluctant to acknowledge a right to strike. As been pointed out, no other basic 
human right exists for the sole purpose of forcing others to do what they do 
not wish to do. The theoretical basis for such a right is its pivotal role in the 
exercise of another right – namely, the right to collective bargaining.13  
Collective bargaining has a long history, as is evidenced by the 
developments in various countries.14 It has also played an important role in 
granting workers a "voice" in organisations. Collective bargaining is an 
adversarial process, which involves negotiation between parties with 
conflicting interests "seeking to achieve mutually acceptable 
compromises".15 For workers it is primarily16 a means of maintaining "certain 
standards of distribution of work, of rewards and of stability of employment", 
while employers view it as a means of maintaining "industrial peace".17 
Since 2007 the adversarial nature of collective bargaining has become 
increasingly evident due to "a decline in negotiating capacity, the re-
emergence of non-workplace issues negotiations, and the rise of general 
mistrust between the parties".18 These are also the key factors that 
contribute to the worsening of the collective bargaining process.19 Botha 
points out that "[t]he focus on strikes, have [sic] unfortunately, not been 
positive, as some industries have been plagued by violent, and/or 
unprotected and sometimes protected strike action that carries on for long 
periods of time".20 
According to Levy, an examination of the data on industrial action in South 
Africa over the last decade "shows an emerging pattern of great concern, 
reaching a point where it must be seen as a question of the utmost national 
                                            
12 Betha v BTR Sarmcol (a Division of BTR Dunlop Ltd) 1998 19 ILJ 459 (SCA). 
References omitted. 
13 Grogan Collective Labour Law 191-192. 
14 Du Toit 2007 ILJ 1405. 
15 Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining 1. 
16 Du Toit 2007 ILJ 1405 points out that the "qualifier 'primarily' is important: power built 
up in the bargaining arena enables trade unions also to engage with broader issues 
and exert political pressure". 
17 See Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 69; as well as 
Godfrey et al Collective Bargaining 1; Du Toit 2007 ILJ 1405. 
18 National Planning Commission 2012 para 34. 
19 Benjamin 2014 ILJ 1-3. 
20 Botha 2015 Obiter 194. 
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importance".21 The data shows that the incidence of strikes declined from 
1995 until about 2003, when it began to increase. More worryingly, the data 
also shows that from 1995 to 2012 there has been an increase in the 
number of strikes that last for longer than a month. This has led to the 
conclusion that "we can expect strikes to become longer in the future".22 
Indeed, the 2014 statistics compiled by the Department of Labour showed 
that there were fewer strikes than in 2013 but that they were longer.23 It is 
important to note that 52% of strikes in 2014 were protected while 48% were 
unprotected. This was the direct opposite of what occurred in 2013 when 
52% of strikes were unprotected while 48% were protected.24 More recently, 
among the 110 strikes which occurred in 2015, 45% were protected while 
55% were not.25 
On the other hand, employers are turning to replacement labour (also 
known as "scab labour") during industrial actions. In 2003 the use of scab 
labour was at 36%, and it rose to 45% in 2004 before another increase took 
place, to 50% in 2005. In 2010, 40.9% of employers reported having used 
scab labour as against 27.5% in 2009.26 
Two recent judgments addressing pertinent issues in relation to an 
employer's recourse to lock-out and the employment of replacement labour 
during a strike have put the spotlight back on the use of these labour 
weapons by employers.27 The two judgments, Transport and Allied Workers 
Union of South Africa v Putco Limited28 and SACCAWU v Sun 
International,29 form the basis of this discussion regarding the use of 
replacement labour during lock-outs. 
                                            
21 Levy "Strike Action" 6. 
22 Levy "Strike Action" 7-9. 
23 Department of Labour Annual Industrial Action Report 2014 3. 
24 Department of Labour Annual Industrial Action Report 2014 viii, 35. 
25  Department of Labour Annual Industrial Action Report 2015 11. 
26 Department of Labour Annual Industrial Action Report 2006 2; Department of Labour 
Annual Industrial Action Report 2010 vii. 
27 It should be noted that employers' recourse to lock-out is not constitutionally 
enshrined like employees' right to strike, but the LRA recognises it as a legitimate 
weapon available to employers. 
28 TAWUSA v Putco 2016 6 BLLR 537 (CC). 
29 SACCAWU v Sun International 2016 1 BLLR 97 (LC) (hereafter Sun International 
case). 
MM BOTHA & M LEPHOTO  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  6 
2 The Putco trilogy30 
2.1 The facts 
This case involved two applications brought by the Transport and Allied 
Workers Union of South Africa (TAWUSA) on behalf of its members against 
Putco and another bus company, Algoa Bus Company. The two applications 
were heard together. Putco carries on business as a passenger bus 
operator and provides public passenger bus services. TAWUSA 
represented approximately 26% of the employees of Putco while the South 
African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) and the Transport 
Omnibus Workers' Union (TOWU) represented approximately 46% and 
27% respectively. 
Putco is a member of the Commuter Bus Employer's Organisation 
(COBEO), which is an employers' organisation member of the South African 
Rail Passenger Bargaining Council (SARPBAC). TAWUSA, SATAWU and 
TOWU were the employees' representatives at the SARPBAC. However, 
TAWUSA resigned from the SARPBAC sometime in August 2012. In 2013, 
wage negotiations at the SARPBAC deadlocked and SATAWU and TOWU 
gave notice that they would commence with a protected strike on 17 April 
2013. 
On 19 April 3013, Putco issued a notice of lock-out directed to the applicant, 
TAWUSA, in response to the notice to strike issued by SATAWU and 
TOWU. The notice of lock-out stated the intention to lock all affected 
employees out. It read as follows: 
In response to the strike notice issued, the Company hereby gives 48 hours' 
notice of its intention to lock-out all employees in the bargaining unit from all 
of PUTCO Limited's workplaces in support of the employer wage proposals in 
the wage negotiations in the South African Road Passenger Bargaining 
Council. (Own emphasis.) 
On the same day TAWUSA advised the employer that its members would 
not strike and would report for duty as normal. TAWUSA also advised the 
employer that any lock-out against its members would be unlawful. 
Aggrieved by the notice to lock its members out, TAWUSA approached the 
Labour Court on an urgent basis for an interdict. The Labour Court framed 
the issue to be determined as follows: 
Crisply put, the question is whether an employer faced with a strike called by 
one or two unions can lawfully lockout all its employees inclusive of those not 
                                            
30 TAWUSA obo members v Algoa Bus Company and Putco 2013 34 ILJ 2949 (LC) 
(hereafter Putco 1); Putco v TAWUSA 2015 36 ILJ 2048 (LAC) (hereafter Putco 2); 
and TAWUSA v Putco 2016 6 BLLR 537 (CC) (hereafter Putco 3). 
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on strike, having not been called to strike by the union they belong to.31 
2.2 Putco 1: The Labour Court judgment 
The court began by noting that it was loath to entertain a debate regarding 
whether or not the lock-out in question was a defensive or offensive one.32 
Relying on an earlier judgment of the Labour Appeal Court,33 the court made 
it clear that the main focus should be on whether the conduct which was 
under scrutiny – in this case the notice to lockout employees – was 
permissible in terms of the LRA.34 In order to answer this question, the court 
mainly focused on the definition of the term "lock-out" as enunciated in 
section 213 of the LRA, namely: 
the exclusion by the employer of employees from the employer's workplace, 
for the purposes of compelling the employee to accept a demand in respect 
of any matter of mutual interest between employer and employee, whether or 
not the employer breaches those employees' contracts of employment in the 
course of or for the purposes of their exclusion.35 (Own emphasis added.) 
The court emphasised the fact that the definition contains the phrases "for 
the purpose of compelling the employee to accept a demand" and "those 
employees". To whom does the phrase "those employees" refer? In 
answering this question, the court held that the phrase refers to employees 
who have refused to accept a demand made by their employer. Put 
differently, the court held that a lock-out must be directed at employees with 
a demand. As the court explained, "logic dictates that one cannot compel 
somebody who does not resist or one who does not present a counter-
demand".36 In similar vein, the court held that a lock-out must have a 
purpose; that is to say, when implementing a lock-out the purpose should 
be to compel those employees to accept a demand. This was so because, 
as the court reasoned, the exclusion of employees without any purpose is 
not a lock-out as defined and is bound to be unlawful in terms of the LRA.37 
In addition to the above definition of the term "lock-out", the court also 
emphasised the fact that section 64 of the LRA – which provides for the right 
to strike by employees, recourse to lock-out by employers and the 
procedural requirements for protected strikes or lock-outs – refers to the 
word "dispute" several times. In the case of a proposed lock-out a notice 
must be given to a trade union which is a party to the dispute or, if there is 
                                            
31 Putco 1 para 1.  
32 Putco 1 para 8. 
33 Technikon SA v National Union of Technikon Employees of SA 2001 22 ILJ 427 
(LAC) (hereafter Technikon SA). 
34 Putco 1 para 8. 
35 Section 213 of the LRA. 
36 Putco 1 para 12. 
37 Putco 1 para 14. 
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no trade union, to the employees.38 Based on this provision, the court held 
that the trade union which has to be given notice of the intended lock-out is 
one which is a party to the dispute. If a trade union is not a party to the 
dispute, so the court reasoned, it ought not to be notified of the proposed 
lock-out.39 
It is important to note that there was a dispute on the papers on whether or 
not TAWUSA had said that it would support the strike called by SATAWU 
and TOWU. The court held that it had not. Also, the court determined that 
both employers (Putco and Algoa Bus Company) had not made any 
demand which had been rejected by TAWUSA and which would have 
constituted a dispute.40 
In applying the law to the above facts, the court held that the LRA does not 
allow a lock-out to be directed at all employees.41 Put differently, the court 
held that an employer faced with a strike by some of its employees may not 
lawfully lock out all of its employees, including those not on strike. The court 
granted an interdict against each of the two employers (Putco and Algoa 
Bus Company) from continuing to lock out TAWUSA's members in their 
employ.42 
2.3 Putco 2: The Labour Appeal Court judgment 
Not satisfied with the Labour Court's judgment, Putco appealed against it. 
Algoa Bus Company did not lodge an appeal against the Labour Court's 
judgment. The fact that collective bargaining on wages and other conditions 
of employment in the transport industry took place at the SARPBAC was 
the key factor in the court's determination of the appeal.  
On appeal both sides raised virtually the same arguments as they had in 
the court aquo: TAWUSA argued that it was not a party to the dispute that 
had arisen at the SARPBAC, and since it had not declared any dispute with 
Putco the lock-out against TAWUSA members was unlawful. On the other 
hand, Putco argued that an employer who was party to a bargaining council 
should be entitled to lock out employees who are members of a non-party 
union because the non-party union members have a material interest in the 
outcome of the dispute. The lock-out, so the argument went, would promote 
collective bargaining at sectoral level and would give effect to the 
                                            
38 Section 64(1)(c) of the LRA. 
39 Putco 1 paras 15-16. 
40 Putco 1 paras 19, 34, 35 and 42. 
41 Putco1 para 19. 
42 Putco 1 paras 43-46. 
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majoritarian principle which underlies the collective bargaining dispensation 
in South Africa. 
The court noted the fact that the constitution of the SARPBAC provided that 
all collective agreements concluded under the auspices of the SARPBAC 
were binding on all eligible employees in the employ of the employers' 
organisations and on those parties and or individuals to whom it was 
extended in terms of section 32 of the LRA. Therefore, the court held that 
TAWUSA's members had an interest in the negotiations at the SARPBAC 
(where SATAWU and TOWU had rejected the employer's wage demands) 
and that the dispute was about a matter of mutual interest to the employer 
and the employees.43Also, the court held that the definition of a lock-out in 
the LRA does not provide that it should be directed at striking employees 
only. Therefore, so the court reasoned, an employer may lock out all 
employees (striking or non-striking) who do not accept the employer's 
demand. It is important to note that the court held that TAWUSA had 
expressly rejected the employer's wage demand.44 
The court went on to explain that an employer, as part of its strategy to put 
pressure on its employees to accept its demands, may decide to lock out all 
employees in order to achieve an individual or group capitulation.45 The 
court further held that since the members of TAWUSA could decide to join 
the strike at any time without giving notice to the employer, it would be unfair 
to expect the employer not to implement a lock-out against them whilst they 
were refusing to accept the employer's demand.46 
In the light of these findings, the court held that Putco had acted lawfully 
when it locked out the members of TAWUSA.47 The appeal was upheld and 
the order of the court a quo was set aside. 
2.4 Putco 3: The Constitutional Court judgment 
Dissatisfied with the Labour Appeal Court's judgment, TAWUSA appealed 
against it. In a unanimous judgment (per Khampepe J), the Constitutional 
Court framed the issue before it as follows: 
The central question in this case is whether the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 
permits an employer to exclude from its workplaces, by way of a purported 
lock-out, members of a trade union that were not a party to a bargaining 
                                            
43 Putco 2 para 62. Moreover, the court emphasised the fact that the members of 
TAWUSA would reap the benefits of the wage negotiations at the SARPBAC should 
the demands of the majority trade union be accepted.  
44 Putco 2 para 67. 
45 Putco 2 para 64. 
46 Putco2 para 65. 
47 Putco 2 para 70. 
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council where a dispute arose and was subsequently referred for 
conciliation.48 
TAWUSA argued that section 64(1)(c) envisages locking out a party who 
has an interest in a dispute, or who is directly affected by it. It further 
contended that section 64(1) does not authorise a lock-out against a trade 
union and its members who are not party to the dispute that has given rise 
to the lock-out. It emphasised that a lock-out is defined as the exclusion 
from the workplace by an employer of its employees for the purpose of 
compelling these employees to accept a demand. Consequently, so the 
argument went, there can be no dispute if there is no demand. On the facts 
of the case, it argued that there could not have been a demand made to it 
as it was not a member of the bargaining council where the dispute arose. 
On the other hand, Putco argued that section 64(1) of the LRA provides that 
notice to a bargaining council is deemed as notice to all unions operating 
within its jurisdiction; therefore TAWUSA was effectively a party to the 
dispute. 
The court reiterated the definition of the term "lock-out" as defined in section 
213 of the LRA.49 It noted that the purpose of a lock-out in terms of section 
213 is to compel employees whose trade union is party to certain 
negotiations to accede to an employer's demand.50 Accordingly, the court 
held that, as a matter of logic, there must be a dispute between an employer 
and employees or their trade union before a lock-out is implemented.51 
Therefore, "any exclusion of employees from an employer's workplace that 
is not preceded by a demand in respect of a disputed matter of mutual 
interest does not qualify as a lockout in terms of section 213 of the LRA".52 
Was there, in the present matter, a demand made by Putco to TAWUSA or 
its members? It should be noted that in oral argument it was contended on 
Putco's behalf that the lock-out notice given to TAWUSA constituted a 
demand. The court rejected this argument and held that the lock-out notice 
could not constitute a demand. This was so because a lock-out notice 
cannot constitute both a notice and a demand at the same time. The court 
explained as follows:  
A lock-out notice cannot constitute both a notice and a demand at the same 
time. The LRA clearly distinguishes between a notice and a demand and does 
not use the two interchangeably. The purpose of a lock-out notice is to inform 
                                            
48 Putco 3 para 1. 
49 Putco 3 para 31. 
50 Putco 3 para 32. 
51 Putco 3 para 32. 
52 Putco 3 para 32. 
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a union and its members of an impending lock-out. In other words, recourse 
to a lawful lock-out must already be available. An employer is not entitled to 
resort to a lock-out if it has not yet made a demand to those employees who 
are to be excluded from the employer's workplaces.53 
Furthermore, the court held that since TAWUSA was not a member of the 
Bargaining Council, no demand had been made to TAWUSA nor had it been 
in a position to accede to the demands Putco had made to the trade unions 
(SATAWU and TOWU) that were present at the Bargaining Council.54 In the 
light of the above findings, the court ultimately held that the purported lock-
out of TAWUSA's members did not comply with the definition of a lock-out 
as defined in section 213 of the LRA.55 
Apart from non-compliance with the definition of a lock-out, the court also 
held that the purported lock-out did not comply with the provisions of section 
64 of the LRA. The court held that the referral process (for conciliation) 
mandated by the LRA had not taken place. It reasoned that even though 
conciliation had taken place at the Bargaining Council and had been 
unsuccessful, this process had not involved TAWUSA because it had not 
been a party to the Bargaining Council.56 The appeal was upheld and the 
order of the court a quo set aside.  
2.5 Evaluation  
From the above, it is evident that both the Labour Court in Putco 1 and the 
Constitutional Court in Putco 3 ruled in favour of the trade union TAWUSA, 
whilst the Labour Appeal Court in Putco2 ruled in favour of the employer 
Putco. 
Regarding Putco 1, the first thing that is apparent is the manner in which the 
court framed the issue to be determined by it, namely:  
Crisply put, the question is whether an employer faced with a strike called by 
one or two unions can lawfully lockout all its employees inclusive of those not 
on strike, having not been called to strike by the union they belong to.57 
By framing the issue in this manner, the court was basically asking whether 
the LRA allows secondary lock-outs. The LRA does not allow secondary 
lock-outs.58 Du Toit et al59 explain as follows: 
                                            
53 Putco 3 para 36. 
54 Putco 3 para 39. 
55 Putco 3 para 40. 
56 Putco 3 para 47. 
57 Putco 1 para 8. 
58 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 200-201; Van Niekerk and Smit Law@Work 439. 
59 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 200-201. Also see Van Niekerk and Smit 
Law@Work 439, where they quote Du Toit et al with approval. 
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A lock-out [as defined in section 213 of the LRA] means 'the exclusion of 
employees by an employer for the purpose of compelling the employees to 
accept a demand...'. The use of the definite article 'the' for employees 
indicates, quite unequivocally, that it is the excluded (that is the locked out) 
employees whose compliance is sought. This would seem to rule out any 
possibility of a secondary lock-out which, by definition, is an exclusion to 
compel employees other than the locked out employees (that is the primary 
employees) to comply with demands. 
This has serious implications for an employer faced with a strike by only part 
of its workforce. Under the previous Act the employer could have effected a 
complete discontinuance of operations (thus avoiding its obligation to pay 
those employees who continued to tender their services) by resorting to a 
lock-out of the entire workforce. The lock-out of the non-striking employees is 
effectively a secondary lock-out, which for the reasons we have shown, 
appears no longer contemplated by the definition. (Emphasis added; 
references omitted.) 
It is submitted that in the light of the facts of the Putco matter, the manner 
in which the issue to be determined was framed by the court in Putco 3 was 
more appropriate: 
The central question in this case is whether the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 
permits an employer to exclude from its workplaces, by way of a purported 
lock-out, members of a trade union that were not a party to a bargaining 
council where a dispute arose and was subsequently referred for 
conciliation.60 
Be that as it may, the court in Putco 1 was indeed correct in focusing on 
section 213 (which defines the term lock-out) and section 64 (which lays 
down the procedural requirements for protected lock-outs) of the LRA. The 
LRA protects the right of every employee to strike and all employers' 
recourse to lock-out.61 However, strikes and lock-outs "are not absolute and 
must be exercised within the legal framework before such industrial actions 
are protected by law".62 This is provided for by the LRA.63 In terms of the 
LRA, a protected lock-out is one which complies with the provisions of 
chapter four of the LRA.64 
In Putco 1, as was also the case in Putco 2 and 3, the court correctly held 
that a lock-out as defined by the LRA must be accompanied by a demand.65 
The definition of the term lock-out in the LRA makes it abundantly clear that 
                                            
60 Putco 3 para 1. 
61 In terms of s 64(1) of the LRA, which in part provides that "[e]very employee has the 
right to strike and every employer has recourse to lock-out..." S 64 should be read 
with s 65, which deals with limitations on the right to strike and recourse to lock-out. 
62 Samuel 2013 J Contemp Man 245.  
63 Section 64 of the LRA read with ss 65 and 67 thereof. 
64 Section 67 of the LRA.  
65 Putco 1 para 12; Putco 2 para 41; Putco 3 para 32. 
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the purpose of a lock-out is to compel employees or their trade unions to 
accede to an employer's demand.66 A demand must encompass more than 
simply requiring employees to perform their obligations in terms of their 
contracts of employment.67 A lock-out must always be accompanied by an 
express demand: for a demand to exist the locked out employees must be 
informed of the actions expected of them for the lock-out to be lifted.68 The 
Constitutional Court in Putco 3 affirmed that "the LRA requires an employer 
to make a perspicuous demand to employees before resorting to locking 
them out".69 
In Putco 1 the court noted that it was loath to entertain a debate regarding 
whether or not the lock-out in question was a defensive or offensive one. 
However, as is shown below, the question of whether or not a lock-out is 
defensive or offensive is a key consideration in determining whether an 
employer may use replacement labour during a strike by its employees. 
3 The Sun International case 
3.1 The facts 
The trade union SACCAWU (South African Commercial, Catering and Allied 
Workers' Union) embarked on a protected strike of limited duration and 
issued a notice in terms of section 64 of the LRA on 21 September 2015. 
The notice informed Sun International (the employer) that the strike would 
start on 25 September 2015. The dispute involved demands for wage 
increases, minimum working hours and a housing subsidy. 
On 22 September 2015, three days before the strike was set to commence, 
the employer issued a notice, the heading of which read as follows: 
"Notification of the commencement of a lockout in terms of section 64(1)(c) 
read with section 76(1)(b) Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995, as amended 
(the LRA)". The lock-out was set to commence on 25 September 2015. 
Feeling aggrieved by the said notice, SACCAWU approached the Labour 
Court on an urgent basis where it sought a declaratory and interdictory order 
in the following terms: 
Declaring that the Respondent's unlimited duration lock-out is not meant to 
counteract the effect of the strike action by the Applicant's members and is, 
                                            
66 Grogan Collective Labour Law 312; Todd Collective Bargaining Law 71; Du Toit et 
al Labour Relations Act 200-201; Van Niekerk and Smit Law@Work 439; Putco 3 
para 32; Technikon SA para 15. 
67 Van Niekerk and Smit Law@Work 439; Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 201. 
68 Grogan Collective Labour Law 310. 
69 Putco 3 para 35. 
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therefore, not in response thereto as envisaged by the latter part of the 
provisions of s 76(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act, No 66 of 1995 as 
amended; and  
Interdicting and Restraining the Respondent forthwith from taking into its 
employment any person for the purpose of performing the work of any 
employee who is locked out by virtue of a lock-out issued by the Respondent 
on 22 September 2015.70 
3.2 The judgment 
The court identified the issue to be determined as whether in terms of 
section 76(1)(b) of the LRA an employer may continue to use replacement 
labour after a strike has ended.71 For convenience, it should be noted that 
section 76 of the LRA is titled "Replacement labour" and provides that:  
(1) An employer may not take into employment any person- 
(a) to continue or maintain production during a protected strike if the whole 
or a part of the employer's service has been designated a maintenance 
service; or 
(b) for the purpose of performing the work of any employee who is locked 
out, unless the lock-out is in response to a strike. 
(2) For the purpose of this section, 'take into employment' includes 
engaging the services of a temporary employment service or an 
independent contractor. 
Although the trade union conceded that the lock-out in question was 
protected, it argued that an employer's right to use replacement labour must 
be in response to a strike and that once a strike has ended, section 76(1)(b) 
of the LRA no longer applies. On the other hand, the employer argued that, 
taking into account the interpretation clause contained in the LRA, it is 
entitled to use replacement labour in a context in which the employer reacts 
to a strike by means of a protected lock-out, even after the end of such 
strike. It would be anomalous, so the argument went, that an employer is 
entitled to meet a union's attack by way of a counter-attack (in the form of a 
lock-out), but with its right to an effective counter-attack being limited by a 
factor of the attacker's choice – the duration of the hostilities.  
The employer relied on an earlier judgment of the Labour Court in Ntimane 
v Agrinet72 where the court had held that the right to employ replacement 
labour accrues at the stage when a defensive lock-out is implemented and 
endures until the lock-out ceases.73 Put differently, the court in Ntimane held 
                                            
70 Sun International case para 1. 
71 Sun International case para 5. 
72 Ntimane v Agrinet 1999 20 ILJ 809 (LC) (hereafter Ntimane). 
73 See Ntimane. 
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that if an employer implements a defensive lock-out (a lock-out in response 
to a strike) it does not lose the right to employ replacement labour should 
its employees decide to terminate their strike. For its part, SACCAWU relied 
on yet another earlier judgment of the Labour Court in National Union of 
Technikon Employees v Technikon,74 where the court had stated (obiter) 
that "if the strike ends so must the employment of replacement labour".75 
In the light of the above conflicting judgments, the court had to decide 
whether or not to follow Ntimane. For the reasons outlined below and 
discussed in more detail later, the court decided not to follow Ntimane. The 
court considered the meaning of the words "in response to a strike" in 
section 76(1)(b) of the LRA. Relying on a number of authorities including 
the Certification Judgment76 and the International Labour Organisation's 
(the ILO) Committee of Experts,77 the court held that the statutory right of 
an employer to use replacement labour is restricted to the period during 
which a protected strike continues and not after it has ended.78 
3.2 Evaluation  
In order to understand why section 76 of the LRA is drafted in the way it is, 
it is perhaps helpful to start by providing some historical context.79 
The early 1990s were marked by major political and legal changes in South 
Africa. For example, President De Klerk announced the unbanning of 
several organisations including the African National Congress (ANC), the 
release of political prisoners (including Nelson Mandela) and the repeal of 
apartheid legislation.80 The negotiations between the government and the 
ANC which began in 1991 eventually led to an agreement on an interim 
constitution81 and culminated in the April 1994 elections.82 Given the 
prominent role played by trade unions in bringing down apartheid, much 
                                            
74 National Union of Technikon Employees v Technikon 2000 21 ILJ 1645 (LC). 
75 National Union of Technikon Employees v Technikon 2000 21 ILJ 1645 (LC) para 9. 
76 Certification case, where the Constitutional Court rejected the proposition that the 
right of employers to lock out is the necessary equivalent of the right of workers to 
strike.  
77 Which stated – with reference to the ILO's Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention (No 98 of 1949) – that workers who participate in a lawful 
strike should be able to work once the strike has ended. 
78 Sun International case paras 13-19. 
79 An in-depth discussion of the history and development of the LRA is beyond the 
scope of this article. Therefore, only the development of the LRA in relation to 
replacement labour is considered. 
80 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 17. 
81 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Interim), 1993 – hereafter the Interim 
Constitution. 
82 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 17. 
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emphasis was placed on labour rights in the new dispensation.83 The 
following labour rights were entrenched in the Interim Constitution: the right 
to fair labour practices; the right to form and join trade unions; the right to 
organise and bargain collectively; and the right to strike.84 Significantly, an 
employer's recourse to lock-out for the purpose of collective bargaining was 
also protected in the Interim Constitution.85 
Within a short time of assuming power, the new, democratically elected 
ANC-led government announced its intention to introduce a new labour 
relations statute.86 There was a need to bring the Labour Relations Act into 
line with the Interim Constitution.87 The Interim Constitution was therefore 
one of the main incentives for reforming the Labour Relations Act.88 A 
commission was appointed to produce a draft Labour Relations Bill. The 
draft produced by the commission formed the basis of the current LRA.89 
One of the major defects of the 1956 LRA was its failure to provide striking 
employees with any protection against dismissal.90 The other defects of the 
1956 LRA with respect to strike law included complicated and technical pre-
strike procedures, onerous ballot provisions, the criminalisation of strikes 
and lock-outs, the prohibition of socio-economic strikes and the ready 
availability of interdicts and damages claims.91 It is important to note that 
the 1956 LRA was silent on the issue of replacement labour.92 However, it 
seems that what the law did not prohibit the law allowed. 
In February 1995 a new body called the National Economic Development 
and Labour Council (NEDLAC) was launched. It is a body consisting of 
representatives of organised labour, employers and government.93 All 
legislation relating to labour has to serve before NEDLAC, where the parties 
seek to reach consensus before it is sent to Parliament.94 
By the time negotiations commenced on the Draft Labour Relations Bill of 
1995, business and labour had adopted very different positions on a number 
                                            
83 Grogan Collective Labour Law 6. 
84 Section 27 of the Interim Constitution. 
85 Section 27(5) of the Interim Constitution. 
86 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 17. 
87 Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Bill (1995 16 ILJ 278) 281. 
88 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 17. 
89 Grogan Collective Labour Law 6. 
90 Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Bill (1995 16 ILJ 278) 299; Du 
Toit et al Labour Relations Act 26. 
91 Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Bill (1995 16 ILJ 278) 300. 
92 Satgar 1998 LDD 49 note 8.  
93 Grogan Collective Labour Law 6-7; Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 18-19. Also 
see the National Economic Development and Labour Council Act 35 of 1994. 
94 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 18-19. Also see the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council Act 35 of 1994. 
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of key points.95 The use of replacement labour during protected strike action 
was one of the "key points of contention" during consultation on the 
proposed Draft Bill.96 Business South Africa wanted strikes and lock-outs to 
be allowed once the correct procedure (including a strike ballot) had been 
followed. It also submitted that employers should retain their right to replace 
striking workers.97 On the other hand, trade unions were adamant that 
replacement labour or scab labour should not be allowed during a 
procedural strike.98 One of the issues which the drafters of the Draft Bill 
considered was the effect of a protected strike on an employer. Keeping in 
mind the extensive protection afforded to employees who participate in 
protected strike action by the Draft Bill, they reasoned that "it is through the 
resolution of the dispute or continued production, with the use of an 
alternative workforce, that the company's viability can best be 
maintained".99 Therefore, the Draft Bill offered an employer facing 
bankruptcy three options: resolve the dispute, employ temporary 
replacement labour or dismiss the striking workers on grounds of 
operational requirements.100 
Negotiations on the Draft Bill were concluded on 21 July 1995. Although 
business and labour had reached consensus on a number of key points of 
contention, they had failed to reach consensus on the use of replacement 
labour.101 NEDLAC referred the Draft Bill to the Cabinet. Cabinet ratified the 
Bill and on 13 September 1995 the LRA was passed by Parliament.102 
Although trade unions have argued for a total ban on replacement labour in 
South Africa103 they have clearly not yet achieved this goal since, as was 
noted earlier, section 76 of the LRA allows the use of replacement labour 
during strikes. For example, employers are allowed to employ replacement 
labour during a defensive lock-out – a lock-out "in response to a strike".104 
By contrast, if an employer initiates industrial action by implementing a lock-
                                            
95 The position of Business South Africa on the Draft Labour Relations Bill of 1995 was 
set out in a document titled "A Framework for Redrafting the Labour Relations Act 
(1995)". On the other hand, the position of organised labour was set out in a 
document (unpublished) titled "Proposals on the Draft Labour Relations Bill: 
Summary of COSATU, NACTU and FEDSAL Proposals (1 May 1995)". See Du Toit 
et al Labour Relations Act 28 note 134. 
96 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 29. 
97 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 29-30. 
98 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 29-30. 
99 Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Bill (1995 16 ILJ 278) 305. 
100 Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Bill (1995 16 ILJ 278) 305.  
101 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 32. 
102 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 32. 
103 See Hepple and Leroux Laws Against Strikes 34; Todd Collective Bargaining Law 
76; Bendix Industrial Relations 613. 
104 Section 76(1)(b) of the LRA. 
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out in the absence of a strike (an offensive lock-out), it may not employ 
replacement labour.105 According to Grogan, this prohibition is aimed at 
balancing the scales when employers resort to lock-outs. He submits that 
without it there would be no inducement for employers to lift lock-outs, which 
could endure indefinitely if the employer manages to keep its business 
running.106 In Technikon SA v National Union of Technikon Employees,107 
the Labour Appeal Court explained the rationale behind section 76(b) of the 
LRA as follows: 
The rationale behind s 76(1)(b) is that if an employer decides to institute a 
lock-out as the aggressor in the fight between itself and employees or a union, 
it may not employ temporary replacement labour. That is to discourage the 
resort by employers to lock-outs. The rationale is to try and let employers 
resort to lock-outs only in those circumstances where they will be prepared to 
do without replacement labour (i.e. when they are the aggressors) or where 
they are forced to in self-defence in the sense that the lock-out is 'in response 
to' a strike by the union and the employees - in other words, where the union 
and the employees are the aggressors.108 
Returning to the Sun International matter, it is obvious that this case turned 
on the interpretation of the words "in response to a strike" as used in section 
76(1)(b) of the LRA. Do these words mean that the right to employ 
replacement labour accrues at the stage when a defensive lock-out is 
implemented and endures until the lock-out ceases, as was held in 
Ntimane? Or do they mean that the statutory right of an employer to use 
replacement labour is restricted to the period during which a protected strike 
continues and not after it has ceased, as was held in Sun International? 
The facts of both cases are strikingly similar. In Ntimane there was a dispute 
between the trade union SACCAWU and the employer regarding wage 
negotiations. The employees engaged in a protected strike and the 
employer responded by instituting a lock-out. The lock-out was in response 
to the strike. The trade union informed the employer that it did not accept 
the employer's demands but was calling off the strike. In turn, the employer 
informed the trade union that the lock-out would continue until such time as 
its offer had been accepted by the union's members. 
The starting point in determining the true meaning of the words "in response 
to a strike" as used in section 76(1)(b) of the LRA is the LRA itself. As 
Grogan points out, the unusual aspect of the LRA is that it contains a 
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106 Grogan Collective Labour Law 315. 
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(LAC). 
108 Technikon SA para 40. 
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specific interpretation clause.109 Section 3 of the Act compels any person 
applying the Act to interpret its provisions (a) to give effect to its primary 
objects; (b) in compliance the Constitution; and (c) in compliance with the 
public international law obligations of South Africa.110 
Section 3 sanctions a purposive model of statutory interpretation as 
opposed to a literal approach.111 The objects of the Act are not simply textual 
aids. They "must inform the interpretative process from its inception".112 In 
other words, the Act must be read in the light of its objects.113 As was noted 
earlier, section 23 of the Constitution specifically deals with labour relations. 
Therefore, the LRA must be interpreted in the light of the Constitution, 
especially section 23 thereof. Put differently, the interpretation clause of the 
LRA emphasises that the Act must be interpreted to give effect to the 
constitutional rights.114 
In Sun International, the court emphasised the interpretation clause and the 
fact that "the constitutionally protected right to strike is not equivalent to the 
statutory right to lock-out as provided by the LRA".115 Indeed, it is correct 
that South African law does not treat strikes and lock-outs as equal 
"weapons".116 Unlike the Interim Constitution,117 the (final) Constitution of 
South Africa protects the right to strike but excludes the right to lock-out. In 
addressing this issue directly, the Constitutional Court in the Certification 
case rejected the argument that "it is necessary in order to maintain equality 
to entrench the right to lock out once the right to strike has been included".118  
According to Creamer, this approach – the Constitution's protection of the 
right to strike and its silence on the lock-out – heralds a new approach to 
the regulation of industrial action in South Africa, based on the 
"'asymmetrical parity' conception".119 Keeping in mind this asymmetrical 
parity conception, the court in Sun International held that the statutory right 
of an employer to use replacement labour is restricted to the period during 
which a protected strike continues and not after it has ended.120 Moreover, 
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the court cited the ILO's Committee of Experts121 where the latter had stated 
that workers who participate in a lawful strike should be able to return to 
work once the strike has ended.122 
It seems to be common cause that the lock-out in Sun International, which 
was implemented by the employer on 25 September 2015, was in response 
to a strike by its employees, which commenced on the same day.123 Also, it 
seems that it was common cause that the termination of the said strike did 
not affect the legality of the lock-out: it remained a protected lock-out and 
the employer was not required to comply anew with the procedural 
requirements set out in section 64 of the LRA.124 Put differently, the lock-out 
(even after the strike had been terminated) was the unbroken continuation 
of the action which the employer had embarked upon on 25 September 
2015.125 As the court put it in Ntimane, "a chameleon remains a chameleon 
even after it has changed its hue".126  
It is important to emphasise that in Sun International the workers called off 
their strike without accepting the employer's final offer – there was an 
ongoing dispute and the employer was therefore entitled to continue with 
the lock-out.127 Under these circumstances, given the court's reliance on the 
ILO's Committee of Experts, where the latter had stated that workers who 
participate in a lawful strike should be able to return to work once the strike 
has ended, were the employees in Sun International able to return to work 
once they had terminated their strike?  It is submitted that they were not 
entitled to do so whilst the lock-out was in place. 
If one were to follow the reasoning of the court in Sun International it would 
mean that the employer's lock-out remained the same protected lock-out for 
the purposes of section 64 of the LRA but at the same time changed (when 
the employees terminated their strike) into an offensive lock-out for the 
purposes of section 76(1)(b) of the LRA – which meant that the employer 
was no longer allowed to employ replacement labour. This cannot be correct 
                                            
121 Which stated – with reference to the ILO's Right to Organise and Collective 
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124 Sun International case para 5. 
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since the employer instituted only one lock-out, in response to the strike by 
its employees. 
Moreover, section 76(1)(b) of the LRA does not provide that the exception 
therein is rendered inapplicable when the strike in response to which the 
lock-out was initiated terminates.128 In Sun International the court applied 
purposive interpretation to reach the conclusion that the statutory right of an 
employer to use replacement labour is restricted to the period during which 
a protected strike continues and falls away after it has ceased. Although the 
LRA endorses purposive statutory interpretation, purposive interpretation is 
no license to ignore the clear language used in the Act. In Technikon SA v 
National Union of Technikon Employees of SA,129 Zondo JP (as he then 
was) stated the following about purposive interpretation: 
It seems warranted that I should repeat what I said two years ago in the Labour 
Court about purposive interpretation. In Transportation Motor Spares v 
National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others (1999)20 ILJ 690 (LC) at 699B 
I said: 'While purposive interpretation has much to its credit, nevertheless, it 
must be adopted in appropriate cases. Purposive interpretation is no licence 
to ignore the language used in the statute which is the subject of 
interpretation.' There is, accordingly, no justification for reading into s 76(1)(b) 
a word which is not there.130 
The above case is a good example of an instance where a trade union, 
relying on purposive interpretation, sought to convince the court to interpret 
narrowly an employer's right to employ temporary replacement labour in 
terms of section 76(1)(b) of the LRA. In this case, the trade union argued 
that the phrase "in response to a strike" in section 76(1)(b) of the LRA should 
be interpreted as referring to unprotected strikes only. The Labour Appeal 
Court, correctly it is submitted, rejected this argument.131 In SACTWU v 
Coats132 the court said the following about purposive interpretation: 
The purposive approach is applied in order to give effect to the purpose or 
ratio of a statute. If the purpose of the statute is evident from the language 
used, the words used must be given their ordinary meaning. The purposive 
approach is not a licence to ignore the plain meaning of the language. 
Technikon SA v National Union of Technikon Employees of SA (2001) 22 ILJ 
427 (LAC); [2001] 1 BLLR 58(LAC). 
There is no ambiguity about the words 'take into employment'. They were 
deliberately used to exclude those who are not already in employment. If the 
legislature had intended the section to have the meaning that Mr Pillemer 
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seeks to attach to the words 'take into employment' then it could simply have 
used the word 'employ' instead of 'take into employment'.133 
In the light of the above, it is submitted that the court in Ntimane was correct 
in its interpretation of section 76(1)(b) of the LRA. Grogan states that "if a 
lock-out commences as a 'defensive' lock-out (i.e. in response to a strike) 
and the workers subsequently abandon their strike, the right to employ 
replacement labour continues".134 Furthermore, we also agree with the court 
in Ntimane that the employer's right to continue using replacement labour is 
counterbalanced by the right to picket.135 Section 69 of the LRA affords 
members of a trade union the right to picket in support of a protected strike 
or in opposition to any lock-out. The right to picket is reinforced by the 
fundamental rights to freedom of expression136 and freedom of assembly137 
as guaranteed by the Constitution.138 The position of the LRA is in line with 
that of the ILO. According to the ILO, taking part in picketing and firmly but 
peacefully inciting other workers to keep away from their workplace cannot 
be considered unlawful.139 It is submitted that the "other workers" referred 
to by the ILO include replacement workers. Importantly, in the South African 
context, there is a Code of Good Practice on Picketing.140 Item 3 thereof 
provides that: 
The purpose of the picket is to peacefully encourage non-striking employees 
and members of the public to oppose a lock-out or to support strikers involved 
in a protected strike. The nature of this support can vary. It may be to 
encourage employees not to work during the strike or lock-out. It may be to 
dissuade replacement labour from working. It may also be to persuade 
members of the public or other employers and their employees not do 
business with the employer. (Own emphasis.) 
There was therefore nothing in the Sun International matter which would 
have prevented the employees from firmly but peacefully picketing to 
dissuade replacement labour from working. 
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MM BOTHA & M LEPHOTO  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  23 
4 Concluding remarks 
South African labour legislation is based on a rigid adversarial system.141 
Currently, as Levy has pointed out, one of the complicating features of 
collective bargaining in South Africa is the extent and nature of what can 
only be described as "bad faith bargaining".142 Negotiations are 
characterised by unions tabling extreme demands and then showing an 
unwillingness to move.143 Consequently, this sort of (bad faith) bargaining 
may increase both the probability and the length of a strike.144 
It is important for trade unions to properly understand the implications of 
their actions before acting on behalf of their members. They need to be 
aware of the fact that when they initiate industrial action in the form of a 
strike there are certain legal consequences which are favourable and not so 
favourable to their members. On the favourable side, for example, is the 
protection against dismissal. It has been described as "the most meaningful 
protection for strikes that comply with the Act"145 and "the most valuable 
protection offered to employees".146 On the not so favourable side, for 
example, is the risk of being dismissed for operational requirements. Also, 
and more relevant, is the fact that employers have the right to replace 
striking workers – with or without a lock-out. The comments made by the 
Labour Appeal Court in Technikon SA v National Union of Technikon 
Employees of SA are apposite, where it said: 
The policy [rationale behind section 76(1)(b) of the LRA] is one that also says 
to unions and employees: Do not lightly resort to a strike when a dispute has 
arisen because, in the absence of a strike, the employer may not employ 
replacement labour even if it institutes a lock-out but, if you strike, the 
employer will be able to employ replacement labour - with or without a lock-
out. The sum total of all this is that the policy is to encourage parties to 
disputes to try to reach agreement on their disputes and a strike or lock-out 
should be the last resort when all reasonable attempts to reach agreement 
have failed.147 
On a broader note, the Sun International matter exposes some of the 
controversial aspects of replacement labour. It has been argued that 
allowing the use of replacement labour is one of the factors that have tilted 
the balance of power in favour of employers in relation to collective 
bargaining, and that the use of replacement labour during strikes may affect 
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the effectiveness of a strike and thus prolong it.148 The Department of 
Labour has identified the use of replacement labour as one of the key 
reasons behind the increasing length of strikes in South Africa.149 
The persuasive force of a strike largely depends upon the extent to which 
striking workers are able to interrupt the employer's business or production 
by withdrawing their labour.150 The ILO regards the right to strike as 
constituting a fundamental right of workers and as an essential aspect of 
trade union rights,151 and the Committee on Freedom of Association has 
always recognised the right to strike by workers and their organisations "as 
a legitimate means of defending their economic and social interests".152 
Employers want to be able to employ persons to maintain production during 
a strike or lock-out. However, from the employees' point of view the use of 
replacement labour deprives them of the only "weapon" that they have, 
namely, the ability to withhold their labour and thereby place economic 
pressure on the employer.153 It therefore prima facie seems odd to entrench 
the right of workers to strike whilst at the same time allowing the employer 
to simply replace them when they exercise that right. 
Violence during strikes has become a serious concern in South Africa.154 
Instead of being characterised by orderly picket lines, South Africa has "one 
of the highest rates of industrial action, with its strikes amongst the most 
violent in the world".155 It has been said that the use of replacement labour 
increases the potential for conflict and violence.156 According to Tenza,157 it 
"has turned out to be the root cause of violent strikes". Strike violence 
usually breaks out when the employer attempts to continue operating during 
the strike.158 Workers who assist the employer to maintain production during 
a strike and so undermine the effect of the strike are also colloquially 
referred to as "scabs".159 There have been numerous instances where 
people who were scabs or were considered to be scabs were either 
                                            
148 Ndungu 2009 Int'l J Labour Res 91. 
149 Department of Labour Annual Industrial Action Report 2010 33. 
150 Todd Collective Bargaining Law 76. 
151  ILO Freedom of Association paras 131, 520. 
152  ILO Freedom of Association para 521. 
153 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Act 241. 
154 Manamela and Budeli 2013 CILSA 322. Also see Rycroft 2015 ILJ 2; Benjamin 2014 
ILJ 10; Von Holdt 2010 Transformation 127; Masiloane 2010 Acta Criminologica 31; 
Botha 2015 De Jure 344. 
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157 Tenza 2015 LDD 219-222. 
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assaulted or killed. This is not a new phenomenon. Five scabs were killed 
during the 1987 strike by railway workers.160 
Although trade unions have argued for a total ban on replacement labour in 
South Africa,161 they have not been successful thus far. The drafters of the 
LRA viewed the use of replacement labour from the perspective of both 
employees and employer. Jordaan162 argues that a total ban on 
replacement labour would mean that the employer was denied the right to 
do business. He submits that a substantial case based on public policy 
would have to be made out why this should be the case. For him, the mere 
fact that replacement labour may reduce the effectiveness of a strike is 
simply insufficient.163 
The Putco and Sun International cases highlight some of the defensive 
industrial weapons that are available to an employer when faced with a 
strike. In the Putco matter the Constitutional Court as the highest court in 
the country spoke in a unanimous judgment. This case will now serve as a 
clear reminder to all employers that a lock-out must be preceded by a 
demand to the employees who are to be excluded from the workplace. As 
was noted earlier, it is important to emphasise that in Sun International the 
workers called off their strike without accepting the employer's final offer – 
there was an ongoing dispute and the employer was therefore entitled to 
continue with the lock-out.164 
Regarding the proper interpretation of section 76(1)(b) and the use of 
replacement labour, it is only the Constitutional Court that can provide a 
definitive interpretation of the phrase "in response to a strike". The 
conflicting judgments of the Labour Court in Ntimane and Sun International 
will most likely lead to a lot of unnecessary confusion. Therefore, it is 
important that this issue be settled sooner rather than later. 
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